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Uzun Hasan’s Project of Alliance 
with the Polish King (1474)*
We might have got Constantinople. This is what the reader could think 
while reading the account of Polish chronicler Dlugosz. He gave us 
a detailed description of the proposal that was made to the King of Poland 
and the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Casimir the Jagiellonian by Uzun 
Hasan, the ruler of Turcoman tribe Ak-Koyunlu (White Sheep). The 
knowledge of this fact has been confined to one statement written by 
O. Halecki. Babinger also mentions it but cursorly* 1. Such is the fate of 
borderline topics2. Thus, nobody has written a detailed analysis of the 
event, let alone examined the account by Dlugosz.
Dlugosz says that on 6 February 1474 two Venetian envoys visited the 
Polish King. Paul who went by name of Omnibene and Anthony offered 
some damask embroidered with the golden thread as a gift for Casimir. 
One of the envoys was going to depart to Uzun Hasan’s country via Caffa. 
The latter who had been sent by the Pope was bound for Moscow. The 
King provided them with the bodyguards. Approximately at the same time 
a Venetian named Catherino Zeno appeared at the Polish court. He 
brought a letter from Uzun Hasan written in Chaldean. Pointing out his 
own successes in the campaign against the Turks Uzum insisted that the
* The main points of this text were presented on the Fifth Pontic Day in Birmingham
on 3 May 1997. 1 am most grateful to Professor Anthony Bryer for his inspiring remarks 
and particularly for drawing my attention to Catherino Zeno’s account.
1 O. Halecki, La Pologne et I’Empire Byzantin, Byzantion 7(1932) 66. F. Babinger 
mentions Zeno’s stay in Poland but he does not say anything about Hasan’s proposal, 
F. Babinger, Z dziejdw Imperium Osmanow. Mehmed Zdobywca i jego czasy, trans. 
T. Zabludowski, Warszawa 1977, p. 327.
2 I alluded to that in my article: From Poland to Tenedos. The Project of Using the 
Teutonic Order in the Fight against the Turks after the Fall of Constantinople, note 51 (to be 
published in Mainz by G. Prinzing).
Originalveröffentlichung in: Ceran, Waldemar (Hrsg.): Mélanges d'histoire byzantine offerts à Oktawiusz 
Jurewicz à l'occasion de son soixante-dixième anniversaire (Byzantina Lodziensia 3), Łódź 1998, S. 171-185 
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King should start the war against Mehmed II in the spring of 1474. Uzun 
Hasan volunteered to provide the army that could consist of ten times one 
hundred thousand soldiers. Dlugosz says that Catherino Zeno had previously 
stayed at Uzun Hasan’s court for three years as the Venetian envoy. The 
chronicler highlights the facts that Zeno was present during the victorious 
battle of Uzun Hasan at Erzincan. He goes on to say that Zeno had also 
been sent as an envoy to the Pope, France, Naples, Hungary and Venice. 
According to Dlugosz the mission contained a confidential message. Uzun 
Hasan offered his elder daughter born by Catherina of Trebizond to one 
of royal sons. He added that she would be baptized. As dowry he offered 
the whole Greek State (omne Graecorum Imperium) which would become 
Casimir’s property after expelling Mehmed from Constantinople. He promised 
to support the King in his conflict with Matthias Corvinus of Hungary 
and he acknowledged the King’s rights to Bohemia and Hungary. Dlugosz 
expresses his delight at the proposal which was so friendly and he voices 
his astonishment at the King’s indifference. Casimir said he would send 
the reply via his own envoy and he sent Catherino to Hungary with an 
escort3. That is the end of the passage.
Around February 1475, while the King was staying in Lithuania another 
envoy from Uzun Hasan appeared before him in the company of twelve 
riders. It was Isaac of Trebizond, of Greek origin but of Muslim religion. 
He asked the King to kindly start the war in the spring of that year. This 
time Uzun Hasan offered three times one hundred thousand soldiers. He 
emphasized the fact that Mehmed’s power had already been undermined. 
Providing him with some gifts the King sent the envoy to Cracow because 
it was Isaac’s dream to see it. The envoy spent the whole month there 
which surprised Dlugosz. Afterwards Isaac went to Hungary and Venice. 
That is the end of the second passage4.
Once again the King demonstrated his independence towards the matter. 
Since nothing came out of it, the historians never explored the issue. 
However it is interesting to see what chances there were for this undertaking 
and why it came to nothing. First of all we have to analyse the source. 
Dtugosz lived in the time of the above events. He worked in the royal 
diplomacy, he tought the royal sons. Even if he did not witness the arrival 
of envoys he must have seen the letters which he quotes.
The fight against Mehmed had long been on the chronicler’s mind. He 
followed the situation in Asia Minor and noted down the victory of Uzun 
Hasan over Mehmed in 14735. However he failed to mention Hasan’s defeat
3 Ioanni Dlugossii Historiae Polonicae libri XII, in: Opera omnia, ed. K. Przezdziecki, 
vol. 14, Krakow 1878, p. 601-602.
4 Ibidem, p. 626.
5 Ibidem, p. 589-590.
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which took place a week later6. His information came from Zeno who must 
have concealed the fact of the defeat for propaganda reasons. In his 
account of the first battle Dlugosz is precise enough to mention Uzun 
Hasan’s sons who took part in the fights. He estimated Hasan’s military 
power as one hundred fifty thousand soldiers7. The whole account links 
up with the earlier information from 1472 when Dlugosz wrote about Uzun 
Hasan’s alliance with the Pope and Venice against Mehmed8.
In the light of the Polish chronicle the initiative of the alliance in 1474 
came from Uzun Hasan who had been well up on the political situation 
in Central-Eastern Europe and he had regarded Casimir as a suitable 
partner for his plans. If one looks at the map s/he will see that the result 
would be an outflanking manoeuvre for Mehmed’s Empire. If one also 
consider the fact that the Jagiellons ruled in the Kingdom of Poland, the 
Great Duchy of Lithuania, the Kingdom of Bohemia and held sway over 
Moldavia and even Caffa on the Crimean, the whole idea seems very 
tempting. Let us have a look at the facts. The analysis of Turkish sources 
by a prewar Polish scholar E. Zawalinski shows that the issue of the 
supposed alliance between Uzun Hasan and Casimir had not left any trace9. 
Sphrantzes managed to write only about the fight between Uzun and 
Mehmed in 1473. The Anonymus Greek Chronicle from the 16th century 
describes the carreer of Uzun Hasan and his family but does not contain 
any mention of the Polish episode10. The silence of Eastern sources seems 
to reflect the actual state of things. In fact it was not Uzun Hasan but 
Venice which came up with the proposal of alliance. In 1470 Venice lost 
Negroponte and realised that it was no longer possible to flirt with
Mehmed11. Uzun Hasan as a potential ally had drawn the attention of the 
Serenissima much earlier. Besides, the slogan of anti-Turkish crusade had 
been in circulation in Europe especially since the fall of Constantinople. It 
was particularly propagated by the Papacy which wanted to involve Poland
6 F. Babinger, op. cit., p. 316.
7 J. D i u g o s s, op. cit., p. 590. Cf. Rozbidr krytyczny Annalium Poloniae Jana Dlugosza 
z lat 1445-1480, vol. 2, ed. S. Gaw^da, K. Pieradzka, J. Radziszewska, supervised by 
J. Dgbrowski, Warszawa-Krakow 1965, p. 307-308.
8 I. Dlugoss, op. cit., p. 569. Diugosz’s library has not come down lo us. But it is 
known to have been very rich and it might have included some works on the Turks. This 
is probably why he was so well informed about the Turkish issue. Cf. W. S w o b o d a, Glosy 
tureckie do rozbioru krytycznego ,,Annalium” Jana Dlugosza, Studia Zrodloznawcze, 27(1983) 80.
7 E. Zawaliriski, Polska w kronikach tureckich XV i XVI w., Stryj 1938.
10 Georgios Sphrantzes, Memorii 1401-1477, ed. V. Grecu, Bucarest 1966, p. 142; 
Emperors, Patriarchs and Sultans of Constantinople 1373-1513. An Anonymous Greek Chronicle 
of the Sixteenth Century, ed. M. Philippides, Brookline Mass. 1990, p. 124-130.
11 N. Housley, The Later Crusades. From Lyons to Alcazar 1274-1580, Oxford 1992,
p. 110.
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in the matter already at that stage12. The geographical location seems to 
suggest that Hasan’s participation in the enterprise was a big advantage. 
Uzun Hasan ruled in the vast areas of Iran (Dlugosz calls him Persian 
King). Being the ruler of the tribe of White Sheep he had good European 
connections. Due to his marriage to the daughter of John IV of Trebizond, 
he was connected with Byzantine and Italian families. Catherino Zeno was 
his wife’s relative13. Thus Casimir was visited by somebody who knew a lot 
about everything that was happening in the East and the West. The same 
goes for Isaac, the other envoy who also came from Trebizond and seems 
to have been well informed. The Empire of Trebizond fell in 1461. Mehmed 
took the last ruler David II to his court, but when he noticed the captive’s 
contacts with Uzun Hasan he had him executed14. Mehmed wanted to sever 
the emotional links between Trebizond and Uzun Hasan. Still, Uzun 
aspired to recapture his wife’s fatherland from Mehmed. So, the actual 
course of events was that it was Venice which sent Catherino Zeno to 
Uzun Hasan, organising a great political action after the loss of Negroponte. 
Venice formed a coalition with the Pope and the Kingdom of Naples. 
Sixtus IV, the Pope from 1471, supported the crusade which included 89 
galleys. The allied forces under the leadership of Cardinal Caraffa and 
Doge Mocenigo set off towards the East. They attacked Smyrna and 
Attaleia. However, the expedition was disrupted by the conflict between 
Venice and Naples15. The crusade was made to take place at the same time 
as Hasan’s invasion in the East. In 1473 Uzun defeated Mehmed at 
Erzincan but a week later he was beaten as had already been said16. It 
shows that Italy was not able to create a military movement against 
Mehmed. No wonder that Venice turned its attention to the North, 
especially to Poland. The Papacy did the same sending Marco Barbo who 
appeared at the Polish court on 4 August 1472. His mission continued the 
prevoius military action of joined papal-Venetian forces. Marco Barbo was 
to put an end to the conflict between Casimir and Corvinus of Hungary
12 M. D^browska, From Poland to Tenedos...
13 The White Sheep competed with the Black one and Uzun Hasan was the winner. His 
state was hardly civilised but it held sway over a large territory. His wife’s sister was the 
spouse of Niccolo Crispo, the ruler of Archipel. Their daughters were married off to Venetian 
nobles, Violanta becoming Catherino Zeno’s wife. Thus for Hasan’s wife Zeno was her niece’s 
husband.
14 W. M i 11 e r, Trehizond. The Last Greek Empire, London 1926, p. 105-112; E. Janssens, 
Trehizonde en Colchide, Bruxelles 1969, p. 160-162.
15 E. Armstrong, The Papacy and Naples in the Fifleenth Century, in: The Cambridge 
Medieval History, ed. C. W. Previle-Orton and Z. N. Brooke, vol. 8, Cambridge 1936, p. 192.
16 I. Czamanska, Moidawia i Wolowszczyzna wohec Polski, Wpgier i Turcji iv XIV 
i XV wieku, Poznan 1996, p. 135 claims that Uzun was eliminated from the fight in 1473 
but I disagree with that opinion. Hasan was still seen as a potential and necessary ally against 
Mehmed.
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and encourage Casimir to join the anti-Turkish coalition17. But the political 
option of Polish King was quite different.
Uzun Hasan’s forces were disperced but not completely defeated if the 
next year, that is in 1474 he came up with the proposal of alliance with 
Poland which might have been suggested by Venice. The propaganda 
spread by both embassies stressed Hasan’s victory and showed Mehmed as 
the one who could be defeated. The idea seemed very attractive to Dlugosz. 
He pointed out that the vicinity of Moldavia made it impossible to avoid 
the conflict with the Turks in the long run. He was right. Also the 
Lithuanians whose Ruthenian territories bordered upon Moldavia encouraged 
the King to prepare the war. However, the King did not share their 
anxiety. What was the reason for that lack of response?
Moldavia certainly played the role of a decisive factor. The Great Prince 
Stephen the Great appealed to Polish and Hungarian protection so as to 
avoid Mehmed’s invasion. This politics necessarily involved Casimir in the 
Turkish issues which he had wanted to postpone18. The King did not intend 
to attack the Turks which is why he sent the Hasan’s envoys back. In 
1475 the Turks got hold of Caffa which had also treated Casimir as its 
protector but he was not willing to take that role. A question can be raised 
why Casimir allowed Mehmed for the liberty whose result was the capture 
of Kilia and Akkerman, the main Moldavian harbours in 1484?
It should be stressed that ambitious Moldavia tried to gain Wallachia 
and wanted to invlove Casimir in these efforts. In fact, Stephen of 
Moldavia did not want to attack Turks. However, his invasion on Wallachia 
was an indirect challenge to the Turks. In the autumn 1473 Stephen 
attacked Radu, the Wallachian ruler. Radu escaped to Turkey which 
provoked its immediate response. Radu regained his throne and the conflict 
between Moldavia and Wallachia turned into the one between Moldavia 
and Turkey19. Stephen started to appeal to Casimir at the beginning of 
1474 reminding him of the sovereign’s duties20. Poland did nothing. At that
17 M. Biskup, K. Gorski, Kazimierz Jagiellonczyk. Zbidr studiow o Polsce drugiej 
polowy XV wieku, Warszawa 1987, p. 289.
'* I. Czamanska, op. cit., p. 135.
17 Ibidem, p. 135-136. Z. Kieres, Zagadnienie konfliktu polsko-tureckiego w drugiej 
polowie XV wieku. Kwestia czarnomorska w okresie rzqdow Kazimierza Jagiellohczyka (do 
1484), §Lskie Studia Historyczne 3(1977) 46. The author points out that Stephen did not 
take advantage of Mehmed’s fight with Uzun Hasan and did not attack Radu in Wallachia. 
Radu was to send 12 thousand soldiers to support Mehmed. The attack on Radu in the 
autumn 1473 was pointless because Mehmed might have taken its side which he did. Kieres 
sees Venice’s influence in that. As early as in 1471 Venice considered Moldavia as a potential 
ally against Turkey.
20 I. Czamanska, op. cit., p. 136. See also: B. Stachon, Polska wobec Turcji i akcji 
antytureckiej do utraty Kilii i Bialogrodu, Archiwum Towarzystwa Naukowego we Lwowie, 
Wydz. II, 7(1930) 2, 171.
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particular moment Uzun Hasan’s envoy appeared at the court with no 
result. The Turks invaded Moldavia at the beginning of 1475. Stephen was 
not completely defeated but he became involved in the Black Sea conflict. 
In the spring of 1475 Stephen lent his assistance to Caffa in the time of 
siege but on 6 June the city was taken. The Turks were joined by Mengi 
Girej’s Tartars from the Crimean Horde which was rather dangerous for 
Moldavia21. Stephen turned to the Hungarian King and only that caused 
Polish anxiety. The result was that Polish gentry insisted that Moldavia 
should not be handed over to the Turks. Thus, Poland launched a military 
action in 1476 which had been preceded by the embassy sent to Mehmed. 
Casimir pointed that the sultan had attacked his vassal22. But this did not 
stop Mehmed from invading Moldavia. The Sultan did not want Poland 
to get involved in the conflict so he sent a conciliatory message to the 
King23. It is essential to note that the Turks did not regard Poland as their 
opponent. They realised it was Moldavia that wanted the Polish King to 
join the conflict24. Evidently, Casimir did not want to stand up against 
Turkey. He did not and could not do it. His refusal to take Hasan’s side 
must be considered in this context. At the same time he turned down the 
Venetian proposal. Casimir wanted to keep his position in Moldavia but 
he avoided the conflict with the Turks. His attention was not focussed on 
the southern-eastern areas.
Let us consider the situation of Polish Kingdom at that time. Casimir 
the Jagiellonian had been ruling in the united state of Poland and Lithuania 
since 1447. As early as the beginning of his reign he was preoccupated 
with the issue of regaining Pomerania of Gdansk from the Teutonic Order. 
As a result he got involved in the 13 year war with the Knights. He was 
not supported by the Roman Curia which took side of the Teutonic 
Knights25. The long struggle ended with the treaty of Thorn in 1466 but 
the Papacy agreed to accept it on condition that Casimir would defeat 
George of Podebrady and the Hussites26. Casimir’s dynastic plans took
21 Z. Kieres, op. cit., 52; I. Czamanska, op. cit., p. 136.
22 In 1476 Casimir stood up for Moldavia recruiting levy in mass from Ruthenia. The 
army gathered near Kamieniec. But the fight never took place because the Turkish army 
managed to disappear. Z. Kieres, op. cit., p. 56, B. Stachon, op. cit., p. 181. Casimir 
must have approved of that as he did not want to get involved. Dlugosz regrets that the 
King never took advantage of Turk’s weakness. Instead, the King went hunting which Dlugosz 
bitterly resents. I. Dlugoss, op. cit., p. 646.
23 As early as in 1475 Mehmed assured Casimir that he hoped for the brotherhood and 
friendship with Poland to last long. Cf.: Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinli, ed. A. Lewicki, 
vol. 3, Cracoviae 1894, n. 204.
24 E. Z a w a 1 i n s k i, op. cit., p. 54.
25 M. Biskup, K. Gorski, op. cit., p. 189-215.
26 Ibidem, p. 287.
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Bohemia into account. Accordingly, in 1471 after George’s death, Casimir 
made his eldest son Ladislas King of Bohemia. The young ruler was 15 
years old27. This did not meet with the approval of Matthias Corvinus 
from Hungary who also claimed rights to Bohemia. Because of his marriage 
to Elisabeth of Habsburg, Casimir thought he was entitled to both thrones. 
Elisabeth was Albrecht’s daughter, who was the ruler of Germany, the 
King of Bohemia and Hungary28. As Ladislas was quite young and did 
not have substantial income, Casimir had to take the burden of maintaining 
Jagiellonian rule in Bohemia. The Polish state was considerably weakened 
by the war with the Teutonic Order. The treasury had incurred debts, the 
army that consisted of levy in mass was badly trained and lacked discipline. 
Corvinus was in a much better situation. The revenue of his state was 
greater. At that time - four houndred thousand Hungarian zlotys whereas 
Poland had eighty thousand zlotys, that is five times less29. Thus Corvinus 
had the funds to recruite the soldiers who were well trained. Since he 
dissaproved of the Jagiellonian rule in Bohemia he aimed at the military 
confrontation which actually took place in the autumn 1474. These data 
are invaluable to realise the position of Poland when Uzun Hasan sought 
its help. What could he possibly count on? Theoretically Poland united 
with Lithuania was a great country and had a military potential at her 
disposal. Practically it was weakened by the war with the Teutonic Order 
and threatened by Corvinus. Uzun could not therefore count on Casimir 
whose attention was turned to the south-west. Even Mehmed realised that 
he was safe from the danger of Polish or Hungarian invasion because the 
two countries were in great conflict.
It is interesting to note that Venice carried on very clever policy, using 
Uzun Hasan in negotiations with Poland. Allied with the Papacy, Venice 
was very suspect to Poland. The King was constantly aware of the fact 
that the Pope might take back his approval of the treaty of Thorn which 
would make Poland lose the access to the Baltic Sea. Casimir feared all 
the connections that might lend the Teutonic Order additional support. 
Corvinus was soon to adopt such a role30. In 1474 a war between Poland 
and Hungary broke out in Silesia. It was obviously the war for claim to
27 K. Baczkowski, Walka Jagiellonow z Maciejem Korwinem o korong czeskq u' lalach 
1471-1479, Krakow 1980, p. 37-45.
28 M. Biskup, K. Gorski, op. cit., p. 175.
29 K. B a c z k o w s k i, op. cit., p. 34. Poland and Lithuania had separate treasuries. The 
King borrowed money from the nobles and the city of Cracow. The yearly board of 
a thousand mercenary riders cost 24 thousand Hungarian zlotys which was one third of the 
Polish Kingdom’s income. Thus the King could only use the army for a short time which 
made the long compaigns impossible.
30 Ihidem, p. 134.
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Bohemia and Silesia was its military theatre. Poland recruited about fifty 
thousand armed men which was the maximum of its military capability. 
The army was mainly recruited from the territory of Poland as the King 
did not want to involve Lithuania in the conflict. The reason was his fear 
that the Lithuanian nobles might demand a separate ruler as their Duke. 
Corvinus had fewer soldiers (ten thousand) but they were very well trained31.
Poland did not have a proper army to speak of. The gentry had not 
taken part in the war for more than ten years. Casimir himself did not 
have any military skill. Only ten thousand men in the Polish army were 
equipped in a Western fashion. Besides, the war was waged for Bohemia 
but the King had to wait for Bohemian army. The Polish gentry was 
ill-disposed to the Silesian war. Even before their departure the nobles 
asked the King for gratification. Dlugosz writes that the gentry was 
dissatisfied with what was going on in Podolia which faced the Tartar 
danger32. Thus it can be interferred that the gentry might have been 
encouraged to fight in the East if the King had not been opposed to it. 
The Silesian war ended with the defeat of Poland but Ladislas managed 
to keep Bohemia33.
In February 1475 the Turks attacked Hungary. Matthiew spread the 
successful propaganda which was supported by Pope Sixtus IV. On 15 Feb- 
ruary 1476 Matthiew defeated Turks at Subocz but he returned to Buda 
on 1 March. The Curia was disappointed34. Corvinus did not stop his 
hostilities against Poland. It was under his influence that the papal nuntio 
excommunicated King Casimir on 15 January 1478 and declared Pomerania 
and the Teutonic Order free from the Polish rule35. Trying to disrupt the 
Hungarian-Teutonic alliance Casimir led to the treaty at Buda where 
Ladislas and Corvinus were placed on equal footing as Bohemian rules36. 
Each side had now the same rights in the fight for Bohemian throne.
These events can be a comment on the years 1474-1475 when the 
envoys from Uzun appeared. Indeed, Poland did not have time for Hasan. 
Besides, the dynastic policy of Jagiellons was difficult to carry out. Elisabeth 
of Habsburg’s rights were not favourably looked at by the Polish gentry. 
The only advantage was that Poland managed to save Bohemia for the 
Jagiellons. Because of the weak army Casimir was a loser in his conflict 
with Corvinus. The same thing might have happened in the case of
31 Ibidem, p. 106-107.
32 I. Dlugoss, op. cit., p. 607-609.
33 K. Baczkowski, op. cit., p. 120. 1 bypass all Ihe diplomatic relations between Poland 
and German princes. They played an important role in the conflict between Casimir and Corvinus.
34 Ibidem, p. 134.
35 Ihidem, p. 157-158.
36 Ihidem, p. 163.
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Polish-Turkish confrontation. However, it is not altogether impossible that 
the war against the Turks would have seem more attractive to the gentry. 
Let us mention the gathering of the levy in mass from Ruthenian territories 
of Lithuania for the war in Moldavia. Obviously, we can only speculate 
because the Turks did not attack Poland directly. What is more, they were 
willing to support Casimir’s claim to Hungary which certainly place them 
in a better light37.
It is evident that Venice disapproved Polish attitude to the Turkish 
question. The proof for that can be found in a treatise written by Philippe 
Buonacorsi called Callimachus, an Italian diplomate who served at Casimir’s 
court. The text is a good depiction of the Polish court’s attitude to the 
anti-Turkish propaganda. The title itself is quite striking: „On Venetian 
attempts to use Persians and Tartars against Turkey”38. Callimachus 
mentions Uzun’s victory and Catherino Zeno’s embassy pointing to the 
Papacy and Venice as responsible for the anti-Turkish opinions39. He 
emphasizes the fact that Venice tried to gain Tartars’ assistance in the 
fight. This made the Polish King and his Council very anxious because 
they feared that Tartars might invade Poland if they were made to feel 
men confident40. It was believed that Venice wanted to steer clear of the 
war and let it happen somewhere else. ,,One cannot count on unreliable 
Tartars. They can just as well take the side of the Turks who might later 
attack Poland”41. The opponents of this opinion claimed that alliance with 
Venice in the defence of Christendom would be a honourable thing42. 
Callimachus may be voicing his own stand here. Aware of his limitations, 
the King did not want to get involved in the conflict. Besides, he realized 
that the Tartars were not seen as a trustworthy supporters. This was soon 
to be demonstrated by the facts. It was rather absurd to take part in the 
war side by side with Venice while other political powers remained passive, 
for example the Empire of Frederick III. Callimachus clearly advocated the 
Venetian project and shows the Polish court as people who sit on the fence. 
In fact Callimachus was more loyal to Venice than to Poland. He used 
a secret code in his correspondence with Serenissima. Casimir was right 
not to trust him.
In 1475 the Turks captured Caffa and the Crimean Tartars accepted 
the Turkish support. At the beginning of the same year Uzun Hasan sent
37 Z. Kieres, op. cit., p. 60.
38 Ph. Callimachi, De his quae a Venetis tentata sunt Persis ac Tartaris contra Turcos 
movendui, ed. A. Kempfi et T. Kowalewski, Varsoviae 1962.
39 Ibidem, p. 40-42.
40 Ibidem, p. 50.
41 Ibidem, p. 70.
42 Ibidem, p. 74.
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his second envoy to Casimir but with no result. Only the sack of Caffa 
made him realize the danger. In May 1476 Mehmed received the Polish 
embassy and assured them that he was going to continue his peaceful 
rebations with Poland. It was to happen at the expense of Moldavia which 
turned out to be less important.
Having achieved hardly anything, Venice concluded a treaty with 
Mehmed in 1479. It accepted the fact that Negroponte had been lost. 
Besides, it had to give up a part of Albania and pay ten thousand ducates 
in return for the right to the trade within the Ottoman Empire43. Its selfish 
policy became apparent at that moment. Accordingly, the Polish King did 
right when refusing to ally himself with Uzun, that means - with Venice. 
In 1489 Poland drew up its own treaty with the Turks. It granted Polish 
merchants the right to trade in the Black Sea region44. Both, Poland and 
Venice saved their respective interests however each did that independently.
Uzun Hasan died in 1478. His death did not put an end to the power 
of Ak-Koyunlu. Although his Trebizondian wife provoked the domestic war 
against Uzun’s son by the first wife, the state was bound to last much 
longer45. It was only sultan Selim (1512-1520) who defeated Uzun Hasan’s 
grandson. Thus, Ak-Koyunlu was a potential ally for Casimir. But the 
Polish King could only find this ally exotic. Hasan could not attract the 
King by flaunting his Trebizondian and Byzantine connections which were 
indifferent for Casimir. The fact that Uzun offered Byzantium to Poland 
can only be seen as history’s joke. The same goes for beautiful Trebizondian 
fiancee. We can only speculate who might have been the beauty’s partner? 
Ladislas of Bohemia, the eldest son was eighteen, Casimir (the later saint) 
was sixteen, John Albert was fifteen, Alexander - thirteen, Sigismund and 
Frederick were too young - seven and six respectively. Uzun’s daughter 
was about twelve, perhaps46. Casimir’s six sons constituted a rich matrimonial 
offer but nobody wanted to sacrifice any of them in the Turkish war, even 
if Constantinople were to be a reward.
Casimir was a very pragmatic ruler. Had this appeal been directed to 
John Albert, a great enthusiast, things might have taken a different course. 
This one however lost his own battle with the Turks in 1497. Still, the 
Byzantine connections reached Poland. Alexander, Casimir’s fourth son and 
the future Polish King married Helen, daughter of Ivan III of Muscovy
43 N. H ousley, op. cit., p. 110. Housley uses the expression: Casimir of Lithuania-Poland 
(111) which is not precise. Casimir was the King of Poland and the Grand Duke of Lithuania.
44 M. Biskup, K. Gorski, op. cit., p. 251.
45 Emperors, Patriarchs..., p. 124.
46 His eldest daughter was already married in 1472. He had two other daughters: Eliel 
and Eziel. The elder might have been twelve then. Cf. M. Kursanskis, Autour de la 
derniere princesse de Trebizonde: Theodore, fille de Jean IV et epouse d'Uzun Hasan, Archeion 
Pontou 34(1977-1978) 86.
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and Zoe Palaeologina. But they were childless so the Byzantine blood never 
got to Jagiellons’ veins. It is interesting to ask whether Mehmed reckoned 
with the possibility of Poland’s participation in anti-Turkish compaign. He 
was preparing Stambul for defence in 1473-147447 but he probably did not 
expect the Polish forces to attack it. Poland could only invade Stambul 
from the land since it had no fleet. But Venice had its fleet so if they had 
formed alliance and if Uzun Hasan had joined it, who knows what would 
have happened? This is, however, an alternative history.
Casimir, whose relations with the Curia that is Venice’s main ally were 
a bit strained because of the Teutonic Order did not want this alliance. 
He did not want to involve Poland in the conflict with the Turks, he did 
not want to involve Lithuania either. He knew, he would pay a high 
political price for it. He promoted his dynasty in central Europe which 
yielded fruit after Corvinus’ death in 1490. Then Ladislas the Jagiellonian 
who was already ruling in Bohemia became the King of Hungary. Still, it 
must be stressed that Poland united with Lithuania constituted a great 
power and therefore it was a target of diplomatic attempts by many states. 
Only a person who was well up on Polish situation could be aware of the 
shortcomings in the army.
So far it is a nice story which allows for a flight of imagination. But 
what, if Uzun Hasan’s offer was fictitious? Venetian sources prove particularly 
useful since they throw a great deal of light on the matter. Uzun’s 
proposition arouses suspicions since he offers absolutely astounding number 
of soldiers to the Polish King. Moreover, his matrimonial proposal and 
the dowry are simply incredible. It is difficult to state that the letter sent 
to Casimir had been faked. Dlugosz definitely comments on a letter written 
in Chaldean. It must be admitted, however, that such forgeries had not 
been uncommon in Europe before. The example can be provided by a letter 
urging Christendom to the crusade allegedly written by David II, Emperor 
of Trebizond48. According to Dlugosz, the name of Hasan’s wife was 
Catherina and not Theodora which was actually the case. However, her 
Christian name does not appear in the sources. Even the Venetian sources 
call her Despina Caton49.
Accordingly, if the message to Casimir was written in Chaldean, it 
certainly should not have referred to the lady in question as Catherina. 
This fact makes the reader approach to Dlugosz’s account with reservation. 
The question whether the letter was genuine or faked must be raised.
47 F. Babinger, op. cit., p. 319.
48 The forgery was brought to light by A. B r y e r, Ludovico da Bologna and the Georgian 
and Anatolian Embassy of 1460-1461, Bedi Kartlisa 19-20(1965) = The Empire of Trebozond 
and the Pontos, London 1980, chap. X, p. 196-198.
49 M. Kursanskis, op. cit., p. 77. Despoina Khatun is not the name but the title.
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Doubtless, the whole plan sprang from Venetian initiative. The envoys of 
Serenissima had been penetrating into other countries, Poland included, for 
quite some time then. Their accounts throw light on the message by Dlugosz.
The Venetian source implies that Uzun sent Zeno to Poland soon after his 
defeat in 147350. Catherino Zeno’s post at Hasan’s court was soon taken by 
Josefat Barbero and Ambroggio Contarini51. They also had to traverse Poland 
and met Casimir in order to transmit message to him. Zeno claims that Polish 
and Hungarian ambassadors had been present at Hasan’s court up to the 
moment of his defeat when he sent them back, because he did not want them 
to witness his humiliation in the war with Mehmed. The text suggests that 
they were accompanied by Catherino52. The identity of Polish ambassador at 
Hasan’s court remains unknown. In the light of Zeno’s account the Polish 
King was busy fighting the Hungarians. It is important that Venice realised the 
conflict. Ignoring the King’s policy, Zeno stressed the potential Turkish threat 
on behalf of Uzun Hasan. „The King heard him graciously and replied that 
on the aceount of the war with Hungary, he could not fight against the Turks 
with whom he was in league”53. Thus Zeno emphasizes the main motive 
behind the embassy which was the threat of Mehmed’s invasion, and this 
converges with Dlugosz. Still, Zeno never mentions any matrimonial plans. An 
assumption can be made however, that these plans could have been discussed 
in a separate letter which may or may not have been genuine.
In his account Zeno tells us that he persuaded the King to put an end 
to the war with Hungary and join the expedition against Mehmed. Even 
if the King promised to do so, which Dlugosz does not say, he never kept 
his word as he was soon to reopen hostilities against Hungary in Silesia54. 
When Zeno and other Venetians arrived at the King’s court Dlugosz was 
not around, he was then accompanying Ladislas in Bohemia. The royal 
sons were taken care of by Philippe Buonacorsi, that is Callimachus, the 
Venetian55. Zeno says that while staying in Poland he actually met Paolo
50Catherino Zeno, Travels in Persia, in: A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia in 
the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, trans. by Ch. Grey, undated, p. 1-69.
51 Travels to Tana and Persia by Josefat Berbero and Ambroggio Contarini, trans. by 
W. Thomas and S. A. Roy, New York, undated. Polish translation of Contarini’s text was 
done by J. U. Niemcewicz, Podrdz Ambrozego Kontaryniego przez Polskg do Persji 
1474-1477, in: Skarbiec historii Polski, ed. K. Sienkiewicz, vol. 1, Paris 1839, p. 1-15; and 
repeated by J. Gintel, Cudzoziemcy o Polsce. Relacje i opinie, vol. 1, Krakow 1971, 
p. 104-111. The historians, however, do not revert to it.
52 Catherino Zeno, op. cit., p. 31.
53 Ibidem, p. 33-34.
54 K. B a c z k o w s k i, op. cit., p. 92. The truce between Poland and Hungary was signed 
in Stara Wies on 21 February 1474 that is at the time of Venetian missions to Poland. 
Casimir started the war in the autumn of that year.
35 M. Biskup, K. Gorski, op. cit., p. 126.
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Omnibene, who is also mentioned in Dlugosz’s chronicle. Zeno goes on to 
talk about his stay at Matthias Corvinus’ court in Hungary56.
The whole account closely corresponds to Dlugosz’s chronicle. Zeno 
certainly paid a visit to King Casimir openly encouraging him to start the 
war against Mehmed. Still, nothing is really said about the matrimonial 
ofFer. From Zeno’s account it can be inferred that the actual initiative was 
taken up by Venice which suggested that Uzun Hasan had been in the 
foreground while Serenissima operated in the background.
Another Venetian envoy, Contarini, provides on excellent sequel to Zeno’s 
message. Whereas, Barbero who had visited Poland earlier does not mention 
any negotiation with Casimir57. Contarini arrived in Poland in April 1474. He 
was received by the King in L^czyca at Easter. The King gave him a black 
damask coat as a gift. Contarini in turn delivered his present and told the 
King his business58. What they spoke about remains unknown. It can only be 
assumed that the Venetian pressure on the King was kept up. Contarini’s 
account testifies to a typical spying mission which focusses on the details of 
Polish geography. If this was the case we can raise the question about the 
content of Contarini’s conversation with Callimachus whom he met in Lublin. 
Callimachus was staying there with the royal sons. Contarini tells us that it 
was the King who insisted on this encounter; he wanted Contarini to meet the 
young princes59. We cannot exclude the possibility that what took place was 
really a confidential talk of the secret agents. As I have said, Buonacorsi 
represented the Venetian raison d’etat and was interested in Casimir’s involve- 
ment in the war. Evidence for this can be found in his own text analyzed 
above. Obviously, Contarini does not mention the topic of his conversation 
with Callimachus and the royal sons. What is certainly known, is that he later 
went to Caffa where he had a clandestine meeting with Paolo Omnibene60. 
Everything seems to indicate that Poland and the neighbouring countries were 
explored by Venetian secret service.
Later on, Contarini set off to Uzun Hasan’s court. On his way there 
he saw friar Lodovico, whom A. Bryer reveals as a fraud61 Lodovico had 
already been to Poland in 1465, when he presented himself as a patriarch 
of Antioch, which was completely false62. Contarini’s encounter with 
Lodovico arouses doubts concerning the genuinity of Uzun Hasan’s pro- 
posals. Thus, we may be faced with a next forgery, which was connected
56 C a t h e r i n o Z e n o, op. cit., p. 34.
57 Travels to Tana [...] by Josefat Barbero..., p. 35.
s* Travels to Tana [...] by Ambroggio Contarini..., p. 110.
59 Ibidem, p. 111.
60 Ibidem, p. 115.
61 Ibidem, p. 144. A. Bryer, op. cit., p. 194-195.
62 J. Dlugoss, op. cit., p. 423-424. Cf, Rozbior krytyczny..., p. 189.
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with the Italian political circles. On his way back via Moscow Contarini 
was received by Casimir again in February 1476. Dlugosz never mentions 
it. Ambroggio Contarini informed the King about his visit to Uzun Hasan’s 
court which he had apparently reached. The King listened to him for half 
an hour. As Contarini states, „the King said that he had heard with great 
interest about Uzun Hasan and the Tartars, and that he felt sure that what 
I said was true; and, he added that he never before met with anyone who 
had told him the truth”63. This would imply that Casimir was not comp- 
letely uninterested in what Flasan had said, but the message is very 
mysterious and it is difficult to state whether it concerned the common 
action against Mehmed and if it still included the matrimonial offer. The 
King certainly cared for good relations with Venice. At least, this is what 
Contarini’s account suggests on that point. Finishing his report, Contarini 
avers that his goal was not an elegant language but truthfulness. The basis 
for this is an analysis of his ,,Brief account on the dominions of Uzun 
Hasan”64. It looks like a typical report submitted by a spy. The report 
seems to suggest that Uzun Hasan, then 70 years old (he was 50 actually65) 
was involved in a civil conflict with his son by his Kurdish wife. Contarini 
claims that Uzun had only 50 thousand soldiers at his disposal and that 
he did not want to wage war with Mehmed. The earlier hostilities were 
only due to Karaman66.
This suggests that Uzun Hasan was only a pawn in the game played 
by Venice. It was Venice which created his public image showing him as 
the one who was eager to attack Mehmed. It was this image that reached 
the Polish court. Thus, the very existence of the matrimonial offer can be 
questioned. Still, it is impossible to explain the goal of Isaac of Trebizond’s 
visit to Poland in 1475. Did he also play the role of the Venetian secret 
agent and that of Hasan’s envoy?67 There are too few available data to 
answer this question. And what about Casimir’s interest in Uzun Hasan’s 
court expressed by the King during his second meeting with Contarini in 
February 1476?
Whatever was the case, the King was not interested in joining the 
anti-Turkish project. What remains obvious, is the Venetian diplomatic 
initiative. It is plausible to assume that Venice may have gone to such
63 Travels to Tana [...] by Ambroggio Contarini..., p. 167.
64 Ibidem, p. 172-173.
65 M. Kursanskis, op. cit., p. 86.
66 Travels to Tana [...] by Ambroggio Contarini..., p. 173.
67 The amount of the soldiers mentioned by Isaac (three hundred) seems more probable 
than the milion from the letter brought by Zeno. Such numbers were common in the sources 
of those times. Thus Isaac may have acted on Hasan’s behalf which does not exclude the 
possibility of him being used by the Venetian diplomacy.
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lengths as to fake Hasan’s letter which promised Byzantium to Poland. 
One more thing is clear; Venice was more than willing to attack Mehmed 
but as it realised Hasan’s weakness it looked for a powerful ally, that is 
Poland. Whoever may have been the author of the fabulous promise 
concerning Byzantium and the marriage with Uzun Hasan’s daughter, the 
Polish King turned a deaf ear to it. Only Dlugosz, who lamented the fall 
of Constantinople in 1453 could have been deluded by it68. Casimir was 
a very pragmatic ruler and never really responded to the supposed Uzun 
Hasan’s project, promoted by Venice. The King can be best characterised 
by an anecdote. Once Casimir sent some gifts to his son Ladislas in 
Bohemia. They included hounds. All of that was seized by one of the 
Silesian princes who was hostile to the Jagiellon. Having learnt about it, 
the King said ,,Make him return the dogs! He can keep other things”69. 
Reality was important. Byzantium, too, was a gift but one from the world 
of legend whereas Casimir was a man of facts. This actually made him 
similar to Mehmed.
68 J- Dlugoss, op. cit., p. 142-145. Cf. M. D^browska, Cantacuzene - ,,The Wolf" 
or Matthias Stryjkowski's Recollection of Byzantium, Byzantinoslavica 56(1995) 257-258.
* Miechowita, Chronicon Regni Poloniae, Krakow 1519, p. 326-327. After: M. Biskup, 
K. Gorski, op. cit., p. 341.
